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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
RICHARD JAIME YANEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010087-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000); purchase/possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503 (Supp. 2000); and tampering with a witness, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508 (Supp. 2000), all third degree felonies (R. 135-36) (in Add. A). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant commit the offense of tampering with a witness by 
threatening a witness notwithstanding no official investigation or criminal 
proceeding was yet under way? 
"The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case is a 
question of law we review for correctness." State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, f4, 
988 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1999); see also State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 
1991); State v. Allen. 2000 UT App. 340, K 7, 15 P.3d 110; State v. Nones. 2000 UT App. 
211, f 5, 11 P.3d 709. Further, resolution of this issue requires interpretation of a statute, 
which presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Spainhower. 1999 UT 
App 280, f 4; see also State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421,424 (Utah 1991); State v. Dickey. 
841 P.2d 1203,1204-05 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
2. A. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that before it could 
convict defendant of witness tampering it did not have to find that an actual 
investigation or official proceeding was under way, only that defendant subjectively 
believed as much? 
As defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal, does not argue manifest 
error, and did not submit his own instruction below, the Court should not review this 
issue, and no standard of review applies. 
2 
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B. Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he did not 
object to the jury instruction concerning the existence of an investigation or official 
proceeding on the basis that it was an inaccurate statement of this element of the 
crime? 
An issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on appeal, is resolved as 
a matter of law. State v. Silva, 2000 UT App. 292, f 12, 13 P.3d 604; State v. Gallegos, 
967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998). 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, 687-88,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984)). Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland. 2000 UT 76, f 19 
(citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687-88); Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 22. 
3. A. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance when he did not move 
to dismiss the charges of possession of a firearm and discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle for insufficient evidence? 
The standard of review for this issue is the same as that provided for Issue 2B, 
supra. 
3 
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B. Did the trial court properly determine that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the witness tampering conviction? 
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, defendant must "'marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.5" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 25 
(quoting State v. Rudolph. 2000 UT App. 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192) (additional quotations 
omitted); see also State v. Vessev. 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998). Evidence is sufficient 
if "'the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] 
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the 
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App. 
13, f 26,17 P.3d 1153 (quoting State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App. 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949, 
cert, denied. 4 p.3d 1289 (Utah 2000)) (additional quotations omitted). 
4. Did the trial court properly rule that the witness tampering charge did not 
merge with the charge of discharging a firearm from a vehicle? 
"Whether two or more crimes merge, thereby precluding separate convictions, is 
then 'essentially an issue of statutory construction that we review for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial court.'" State v. Lopez. 2001 UT App. 123, 
H 9, 24 P.3d 993 (quoting State v. Pierson. 2000 UT App. 274, f 8, 12 P.3d 103 
(additional quotation omitted)). 
4 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 2000); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with three third degree felonies: discharge 
of a firearm from a vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2000); 
tampering with a witness, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2) (Supp. 2000); 
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (Supp. 2000) (R. 2-4, 65-67).l Following a one-day trial, a jury 
convicted him as charged (R. 68-70, 72-74, 107-09; 183:214). Defendant moved to arrest 
judgment as to the tampering charge, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish defendant's subjective belief that an investigation or official proceeding was 
under way at the time charged in the information (R. 110-18; 183:223-24). The court 
denied defendant's motion and sentenced defendant to the state prison for three-to-five 
years for count one, and zero-to-five years each for counts two and three, to be served 
concurrently (R. 137-38; 183:231,235). Defendant timely appealed (R. 158-59, 169-70). 
lThe parties stipulated at trial that defendant was adjudicated delinquent as a 
juvenile in 1997 for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult 
(R. 183:162). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Near 9:30 a.m on the morning of May 9, 2000, Robert Maestas was driving to 
work when he noticed defendant crouching down by a bridge near 500 South 1100 West 
in Salt Lake City (R. 108:83-84, 86).2 Defendant appeared to be looking around as if 
waiting for something or looking to see who was watching (R. 183:83). A gold Honda 
automobile was idling, empty, next to the bridge (R. 183:84). Thinking defendant might 
require help of some sort, Maestas turned around and returned to the bridge, at which 
point he saw that defendant was spraying graffiti on the side of the bridge (R. 183:84-85). 
As Maestas neared the bridge, defendant ran to his car (R. 183:86). Maestas passed 
without stopping and noticed behind him that defendant's car had pulled away going the 
opposite direction, turned around, and begun to follow him (R. 183:87). 
Believing he was being followed, Maestas drove home and parked his truck in an 
alley by his neighbor's house where it could not be seen from the street and waited fifteen 
minutes without incident (R. 183:87-89). He then left for work again, driving a different 
route than he normally used for fear of running into defendant (R. 183:88-89). As he 
reached the intersection of 800 West and 850 South, he again saw defendant's gold 
Honda, this time parked at an abandoned house (R. 183:90-92). As he passed the house, 
2Because this appeal involves a question concerning the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the State presents the facts in some detail. On appeal, this Court reviews the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 422-23 (Utah App.), cert 
denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
6 
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he saw defendant emerge from the bushes with a small caliber handgun in his left hand 
(R. 183:92, 102). Defendant dropped the bag he was holding, pointed at Maestas with 
one finger of his right hand as Maestas passed him, then got into his car and followed 
Maestas (R. 183:93-94,114). 
Maestas turned a comer and looked behind him for defendant, who had followed 
him through the turn (R. 183:93-94). Maestas decided defendant was "coming after" him 
and decided he would stop at a nearby senior citizen's center to call the police (R. 183:94-
95). However, as he drew close to the senior citizen's center, defendant had drawn to 
within two car lengths of him and was traveling at "a very high" rate of speed (R. 
183:95). Fearing for the safety of the people at the senior citizen's center, and worried 
that defendant might try to ram his truck from behind, Maestas decided against stopping 
to call the police (R. 183:96,109). 
Looking in his mirror, Maestas noticed defendant put his left arm out the driver's 
window holding the handgun and point the gun toward Maestas' truck (R. 183:96-97). 
Maestas was approaching a stop sign when he heard the unmistakable "pop" of gunfire 
and crouched down on the bench seat of his truck to avoid being hit (R. 183:97-99). 
Looking in his "blind-spot mirror" located just above his regular rear view mirror, 
Maestas saw the gun in defendant's hand recoil twice, although he did not hear any more 
audible shots (R. 183:97-99). As the truck stopped, Maestas threw it into reverse, 
anticipating that defendant would try to ram the truck and hoping that, with his own truck 
7 
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in reverse, the impact would disable defendant's Honda and knock defendant out (R. 
183:99-100). However, defendant turned his car around instead and went back the way 
he had come (R. 183:100). Maestas took a moment while stopped to scribble down 
defendant's license plate number, guessing at the last letter (R. 183:104). 
Maestas drove straight home, yelling to his neighbor as he arrived to call the police 
(R. 183:102-03). Fearing defendant would return, Maestas himself ran inside and called 
the police to report the morning's events (R. 183:103). After giving his statement to the 
police and describing defendant, Maestas chose defendant's photo from a ten-photo 
spread (R. 183:103,112, 114-16). At trial, Maestas was absolutely sure about his 
identification of defendant and the fact that defendant had held a gun and fired it at him 
(R. 183:115). 
A significant part of Maestas' testimony was corroborated at trial by Matthew 
Shell, who was riding his bike from his friend's house near the abandoned house at 800 
West and 850 South between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. on May 9, 2000 (R. 183:118-19). As 
he left his friend's house, Shell saw defendant's gold Honda parked at the abandoned 
house, noting that fact because there are generally no cars parked there and none had been 
there scant minutes before when he had arrived (R. 183:119-20). He noticed defendant 
come from the vicinity of the house holding what "looked like a small caliber [silver] 
handgun" in his left hand (R. 183:121). Shell then saw Maestas drive by in his truck, 
having known him most of his life and being familiar with his truck (R. 183:104-05, 121-
8 
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22, 129). Shell saw defendant point with his right hand as Maestas drove by, then saw 
him get into his car and follow Maestas down the street (R. 183:121-22). Shell continued 
halfway down the block before hearing two pops that "sounded like gunshots" coming 
from "around the corner" in the direction Maestas and defendant had driven (R. 183:123-
24). He then heard tires screech twice, sounding like a car had stopped quickly, turned 
and taken off (R. 183:124). He was positive in his identification of the sounds he heard 
(R. 183:124-26). 
Officer Robin Howell visited the abandoned house and found graffiti from two 
gangs written by two individuals (R. 183:138-39). One moniker on the house was 
"Sleepy," which is the moniker defendant uses in connection with his membership in the 
Avenues 43rd Street Gang (R. 183:141). The officer presented Maestas with a ten-picture 
photo spread, and Maestas identified defendant's picture as the person he had seen by the 
bridge and at the abandoned house (R. 183:141-43). The officer also checked out the 
license number Maestas had given him, finding that it matched the plate on defendant's 
gold Honda, except for two letters (R. 183:143-44). 
When Officer Howell confronted defendant, defendant admitted to doing the 
graffiti on both the bridge and the abandoned house and admitted seeing Maestas' truck 
pass him twice at the bridge (R. 183:146-47). He denied having a gun at the abandoned 
house, however, claiming instead to have been holding a can of spray paint in his hand 
(R. 183:147). When he saw the same truck pass, he claimed he flashed a derogatory 
9 
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gesture with his hand (R. 183:148). He then got in his car and drove home, which 
required that he go the same direction as the truck for a couple of blocks before turning 
(R. 183:148). Defendant denied ever possessing a gun (R. 183:148). 
Officer Howell testified that the police take graffiti complaints seriously, as graffiti 
has the potential to "start gang wars/' and individuals who create graffiti can sometimes 
be identified by the graffiti and prosecuted or included on the police database (R. 
183:151-52). He did not find any shell casings or weapon during his investigation, noting 
that they could have been almost anywhere by the time he conducted his searches, three 
days after the events (R. 183:155-59). He also noted that police received no calls from 
local residents concerning shots being fired, but explained that in that area, people not 
directly involved in a shooting report shots only fifty percent of the time (R. 183:158-60). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: A proper review of the entirety of the witness tampering statute defeats 
defendant's claim that subsection (2)(c) requires that an official investigation or 
proceeding be under way at the time the tampering occurs in order to establish a violation 
of this subsection of the statute. The statute evinces a legislative intent to include all 
forms of witness tampering within the scope of the statute. Defendant's interpretation 
would permit an individual to threaten an eyewitness with impunity so long as the witness 
has not yet reported the criminal conduct to the authorities. To permit this type of witness 
tampering to escape prosecution under this subsection of the statute when witness 
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tampering at the same point in time under subsection (1) is criminalized would contradict 
the purpose behind the statute. 
Point II: This Court should not reach defendant's challenge to the jury instruction 
involving the existence of an official proceeding or investigation inasmuch as defendant 
failed to object to the instruction below, offered none of his own, and does not argue 
manifest error on appeal. 
Further, defendant fails to establish ineffective assistance by his trial counsel based 
on counsel's failure to object to the jury instruction. The instruction was a proper 
statement of the State's burden under section 76-8-508(2)(c), and counsel cannot be 
ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. 
Point III: This Court should not reach defendant's arguments challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence adduced below to support his convictions of possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, because he failed 
to preserve the issues for appellate review and does not argue either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Neither should this Court find any ineffectiveness in defense 
counsel's failure to preserve the issue as to these two convictions where the evidence was, 
in fact, sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. 
Additionally, the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom was sufficient to 
support defendant's conviction for witness tampering where it established that defendant 
knew the victim, had seen him commit at least one criminal act, gestured at the victim 
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while holding a handgun, twice followed the victim in his car, and did so in a manner 
reasonably causing the victim to fear for his physical safety, all within the span of a few 
minutes. 
Point IV: Because witness tampering may be established by numerous variations 
of facts, the determination of whether the conviction for witness tampering merged with 
the conviction for discharging a firearm from a vehicle depends on a review of the 
evidence established at trial. That evidence, together with the jury instructions, establish 
that both convictions were based on independent facts and were separately proven at trial, 
negating any greater-lesser relationship between the two offenses and defeating 
defendant's merger claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WITNESS TAMPERING STATUTE EVINCES NO 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO EXCEPT FROM ITS SCOPE 
THREATS OF BODILY INJURY MADE TO EYEWITNESSES 
BEFORE THEY ARE ABLE TO APPRAISE AUTHORITIES OF 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting his argument that a person 
cannot be guilty of witness tampering under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(c) unless an 
official investigation or proceeding was under way at the time the threat of bodily injury 
was made. Br. of Aplt. at 12-16. He contends that the "plain and unambiguous" 
language of the statutory subsection "implies" that an official investigation or proceeding 
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must first have been instituted against the suspect at the time of the threat, because you 
cannot be a witness or an informant absent such proceedings. kL at 13-14.3 However, a 
proper review of the statute as a whole does not support defendant's interpretation of 
subsection (2)(c). 
Defendant presented his position to the trial court in a motion to dismiss the 
witness tampering charge, and the trial court rejected it (R. 112-18; 183:210-13). The 
trial court held that the legislative intent behind the statute is clear from reading the 
statute as a whole and that such a reading requires only that the person making the threat 
have a subjective belief that an official investigation or proceeding is pending or is about 
to be instituted at the time (R. 183:212) (ruling in Add. B). 
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law to be reviewed for correctness on appeal. 
See State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, f 15, 4 P.3d 795; State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 
(Utah 1993); State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). The role of an appellate 
court is not to determine which of several meanings may be technically correct, but to 
interpret the words of the statute "in accord with their usual and accepted meaning." 
3While defendant expressly says that the proceeding must have been instituted 
"against the suspect," he provides no argument as to why the statute cannot be used 
against a person who tampers with a witness or informant in official proceedings focused 
on a third person. In fact, the statute's broad language provides for such a prosecution. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2)(b). Accordingly, the State does not address this point. 
See State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that "Utah courts 
routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments."); see also State v. 
Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground 
that defendant's brief was without legal analysis or authority to support the argument). 
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State v. Christensen. 2001 UT 14, fflf 3, 5, 20 P.3d 329 (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)). To that end, the appellate court need look 
only at the plain language of the statute to give effect to legislative intent where the 
language is clear and unambiguous. State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998); 
State v. Harlev. 1999 UT App 197, f 10, 982 P.2d 1145 (it is well settled that '"when 
faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the 
statute.m), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). Accordingly, an appellate court 
presumes that the legislature used each tenn of a statute advisedly. See State v. Chanev, 
1999 UT App 309, f 22, 989 P.2d 1091. 
However, where there is any ambiguity to be found in a section, this Court may 
define legislative intent by construing the section at issue in connection with the 
remainder of the statute. See State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230, 234-35 (Utah App. 1998) 
("When interpreting a statute all parts must be construed together without according 
undue importance to a single or isolated portion.") (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992)), rev'd on other gnds. 
1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986. See also Bott v. Deland. 922 P.2d 732, 742 (Utah 1996) 
("When interpreting an ambiguous term [in a statute], we look to the legislative history 
and the purpose of the statute as a whole to give effect to legislative intent."). 
This Court has long recognized that the primary goal in interpreting statutes is: 
to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidence by the plain language, in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.... We need to look 
beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity.... In analyzing 
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a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the 
provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of 
its terms However, if we find a provision that causes doubt or 
uncertainty in its application, we must analyze the act in its entirety and 
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose.... 
Burns. 2000 UT 56, f 25 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Lvon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 55, f 17 & n.5, 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing the duty of an appellate court to 
"avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute, or related 
statutes, meaningless"). 
A review of the entire statute in question supports the trial court's determination 
on this point. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (Supp. 2000) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he 
has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration 
of his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would 
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of 
any act performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity 
as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
(Emphasis added.) Add. A. 
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Looking at the statute as a whole, it is apparent that the Legislature intended to cast 
a broad net with the language it used. The language deals with hampering an 
investigation or official proceeding at any stage: before it begins, while it is ongoing, or 
after it is completed. It encompasses activity which prevents reliable information from 
reaching authorities, prevents authorities from using or establishing in official 
proceedings the information they already have, or retaliates for information authorities 
use. It is directed at those who act criminally and may become, are, or have been the 
subject of an investigation or proceeding; those who know of the criminal conduct and act 
to prevent the truth from reaching the authorities or act to retaliate against a witness for 
having helped the authorities in their investigation or prosecution; and those who solicit 
someone or are successfully solicited to hinder the passage of reliable information to the 
authorities. Nothing in the statute purports to except from its scope any particular tamper-
related conduct at any stage after the criminal conduct occurs. 
Moreover, subsection (1) expressly defines the scope of the time frame within 
which all tampering efforts, exclusive of retaliatory efforts, violate the statute: when the 
actor acts with the subjective belief that "an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted[.]" State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985); 
see also State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989). It is unreasonable to ascribe to the Legislature, as defendant attempts to do under 
subsection (2), the intent to permit a person to use, with impunity, at that same point in 
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time what may be the most persuasive or successful means of tampering with a witness: 
the threat of bodily injury. To adopt defendant's reading of the statute—to require that an 
official investigation or proceeding actually be under way at the time a threat of bodily 
injury is made, regardless of the actor's subjective belief—would be to reward those who 
know that a report to the authorities is likely to be imminent and who act quickly to make 
one of the most serious threats that can be made. Nothing in the statute or in defendant's 
brief provides a reasonable explanation for exclusion of pre-investigatory tampering in 
the form of threats of bodily harm. See State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108,1f 12, 992 P.2d 986 
(the appellate court will interpret statute to avoid absurd results). 
The statute as a whole tends to encompass the entire spectrum—from the doing of 
the act to be investigated to the completion of the legal process involving conviction and 
sentencing for that act. Having painted the statute with such a broad brush, the legislature 
is not likely to have intended defendant's narrow and restrictive reading of subsection (2). 
Further, that reading does not comport with the legislative intent reasonably evinced on 
the face of the statute as a whole. The trial court's inclusion of the actor's subjective 
belief into subsection (2) is reasonable and is in keeping with the overall intent behind the 
statute. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss did not 
amount to error, and defendant's claim should be rejected.4 
4Defendant ends this point by arguing that the trial court's "erroneous" 
interpretation of subsection 2(c) deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right 
to be appraised of the charges against him because it permitted the State to obtain a 
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POINT II 
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE BY NOT OBJECTING TO A WITNESS 
TAMPERING INSTRUCTION PROPERLY DEFINING THE 
STATE'S BURDEN OF PROVING DEFENDANT'S SUBJECTIVE 
INTENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury concerning an 
element of the witness tampering offense, thereby warranting reversal of his conviction. 
Br. of Aplt. at 16-19. Specifically, he claims that, pursuant to his argument in Point I, 
supra, the State was required to prove as an element of the witness tampering charge that 
an official proceeding or investigation was under way at the time he pursued the victim. 
Id. at 12-18. However, in keeping with its ruling contrary to that position, the trial court 
instructed the jury that the charged offense "does not require the State to prove that an 
'official proceeding or investigation5 was underway, but only that defendant subjectively 
conviction without having to prove one of the requisite elements of the crime: that an 
official proceeding or investigation was under way at the time of defendant's charged 
conduct. Br. of Aplt. at 15-16. Because there was no error in the trial court's 
interpretation of the witness tampering statute (see text in Point I, supra), the State does 
not respond to this argument. Moreover, the claim was not raised below, and defendant 
fails to argue either plain error or manifest injustice on appeal. Bryant. 965 P.2d at 546-
47; see also State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). Further, while 
defendant includes a string citation to establish that he has a right to be appraised of the 
charges, he provides no authority to support his argument and makes no attempt to fit this 
case into any analytical framework relating to his constitutional claim. Accordingly, this 
Court should not reach the merits of this claim. See State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 
(Utah App. 1998) ("Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed 
arguments."); State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address 
argument on the ground that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority 
to support his argument"). 
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believed that an 'official proceeding or investigation' was underway" (R. 89; jury inst. 
11) (in Add. C). Defendant claims that the instruction constitutes reversible legal error 
because it does not accurately reflect the requisite elements of the statute. Br. of Aplt. at 
18. He also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
instruction. Id. at 20-22. However, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of his 
claim, as it was not preserved below. Further, defendant fails to establish his alternative 
related claim of ineffective assistance. 
A. This Claim is not Preserved 
Defendant acknowledges that his counsel did not object to the challenged 
instruction below. Br. of Aplt. at 3-4. As no objection was registered, the claim can be 
reviewed only to avoid manifest injustice. See State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App. 30, ^  22, 
975 P.2d 469. Defendant does not claim to have suffered any manifest injustice, but 
instead claims that the issue warrants review on its merits "because (1) Appellant is 
represented by new counsel, and (2) the record is adequate for review." Br. of Aplt. at 4. 
He goes on to argue the merits of his claim first, without mention of manifest injustice. 
Id at 16-19. He then addresses himself to a related ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 20-22. 
The mere fact that defendant is represented by new counsel and presents an 
"adequate" record on appeal does not permit him to argue the merits of just any issue not 
properly preserved for appellate review. It merely permits him to present for the first time 
on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
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76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (disposing of the threshold requirement of an adequate record); State 
v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 40-41 (Utah 1996). As defendant has failed to argue manifest 
error and proposed no alternative instruction of his own below (R. 43-55), this Court 
should not reach the merits of his claim. See State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 
1987); see also State v. Swan. 279 Mont. 483, 928 P.2d 933, 935 (Mont 1996) ("This 
Court will not predicate error upon the failure to give an instruction when the party 
alleging the error failed to offer the instruction.") (citation omitted). 
B. Defendant Fails to Establish the Related Claim of Ineffective Assistance 
Defendant attempts to avoid the consequences of his failure to challenge the jury 
instruction by including in his appellate argument a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. Br. of Aplt. at 20-22. He claims that he did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel because his counsel did not object to the giving of a jury instruction on the 
witness tampering charge which required that the jury find that defendant subjectively 
believed that an official proceeding or investigation was underway at the time he pursued 
the victim in this matter. Id. 
The issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on atppeal, is reviewed 
as a matter of law. State v. Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, If 12, 13 P.3d 604; State v. 
Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998). 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
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standard of reasonable professional judgment." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^  19 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)); Silva, 
2000 UT App. 292, f 22. Appellate courts indulge a strong presumption that trial 
counsel's conduct under the circumstances might be considered sound trial strategy, 
requiring defendant to demonstrate that "counsel's actions were not conscious trial 
strategy" and that "there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's 
actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations omitted); see 
also Litherland. 2000 UT 76, fflf 17, 19. This Court will not second-guess counsel's 
performance on appeal, no matter how flawed his strategic choices may appear in 
hindsight. See State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 591-92 (Utah App. 1995), rev'd on other 
gnds, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951; State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993). 
Proof of ineffectiveness cannot be "a speculative matter," but must be a "demonstrable 
reality." See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Fernandez 
v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998). 
Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88); Silva, 2000 UT App. 292, f 22. To show the 
requisite prejudice, defendant must "'proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
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would have been different.'" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, % 22 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 
871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994)) (additional quotations 
omitted). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome." Saunders. 893 P.2d at 591; State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah 
App. 1993). Where a defendant fails to establish one prong of the two-prong test, this 
Court need look no further and may reject the claim. See State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d 
153, 157(Utah 1989); Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 22; State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195, 
1199 (Utah App.) (for each of two claims of ineffectiveness, the court refuses to reach 
one prong of the test where defendant fails to establish the other prong), cert, denied. 929 
P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah App. 1991) (as in "most 
cases," the court disposes of the ineffectiveness claim based on defendant's failure to 
demonstrate the requisite prejudice). 
In this case, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness fails because defense counsel 
cannot render ineffective assistance for failing to make futile objections. See State v. 
Simmons. 2000 UT App. 190, % 7, 5 P.3d 1228; see also Chacon. 962 P.2d at 51. As 
established in Point I, supra, section 76-8-508 does not require that the State establish the 
actual existence of an official proceeding or investigation at the time the tampering 
occurs. Instead, the statute is directed, in relevant part, toward tampering done at a time 
when the actor subjectively believes that an official proceeding or investigation "is 
pending or about to be instituted." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508; see alio Point I, 
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supra. Consequently, defense counsel's failure to object to the challenged instruction as 
an improper statement of the elements of witness tampering cannot constitute ineffective 
assistance.5 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL SUFFICIENCY 
CLAIMS RELATING TO TWO OF HIS CONVICTIONS AND HAS 
NOT ARGUED PLAIN ERROR, PERMITTING SUMMARY 
REJECTION OF HIS ARGUMENTS; HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE THESE 
ARGUMENTS WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THESE TWO CONVICTIONS; FINALLY, THE 
EVIDENCE WAS ALSO SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S THIRD CONVICTION, WITNESS TAMPERING 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his 
convictions. Br. of Aplt. at 22-37. He contends that all three convictions fail for the 
absence of any "compelling evidence" that he owned or fired a gun at the victim. IdL at 
26-31. As to the witness tampering charge, he argues further that the evidence did not 
establish either that the victim was a witness or informant in an on-going investigation or 
official proceeding or that defendant himself believed that such a proceeding was pending 
Defendant includes a footnote argument that this Court should ignore United 
States Supreme Court precedent permitting harmless error review of an erroneous 
elements instruction and instead apply the state constitution to hold that this alleged 
erroneous elements instruction should mandate reversal as a matter of law. Br. of Aplt. at 
19-20 n.3. However, as the challenged instruction was an accurate statement of the 
State's burden under section 76-8-508, this Court need not address this argument. 
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or about to be instituted. Id at 35-36. However, this Court should reject all of 
defendant's claims. 
A. Defendant Failed to Preserve a Sufficiency Challenge for the Charges of 
Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person and Discharge of a Firearm 
from a Vehicle 
Defendant must challenge at trial the sufficiency of the evidence "by proper 
motion or objection to preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 16, 
10 P.3d 346. Defendant failed to do so in this case with respect to the charges of 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person and discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. 
Br. of Aplt. at 3. Neither does he argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances 
on appeal. See Holgate. 2000 UT 74, ^  11, 15. Accordingly, this Court should not reach 
the merits of his insufficiency claims as to these two charges. See Bryant 965 P.2d at 
546-47; see also Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
B. Defense Counsel was Not Ineffective for Failing to Challenge the Sufficiency 
of the Evidence Because the Evidence was in fact Sufficient to Support the 
Jury's Verdicts 
To escape the consequences of his inaction below, defendant contends that his 
counsel was ineffective because he failed to preserve a sufficiency challenge to two 
charges despite being charged with knowledge that the preservation was necessary to 
pursue the issues on appeal. Br. of Aplt. at 23. Specifically, he complains that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that he either owned or fired a gun at the victim, 
thereby preventing his conviction of possession of a firearm by a restricted person and 
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discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. Id. at 31. To establish his claim, defendant must 
meet the heavy burden outlined in Point 2B, supra. 
However, contrary to defendant's argument, there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the jury could find that defendant possessed and fired a handgun. So long as there 
was sufficient evidence, defense counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as the challenge would have been futile. See 
Simmons. 2000 UT App. 190, f 7; see also Chacon. 962 P.2d at 51 (counsel's failure to 
make a futile objection does not establish ineffectiveness); State v. BueL 700 P.2d 701, 
703 (Utah 1985) (effective representation does not require that counsel object when doing 
so would be futile). 
To prevail on appeal, defendant must "'marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict.'" Silva. 2000 UT App. 292, f 25 (quoting State v. Rudolph, 
2000 UT App. 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192) (additional quotations omitted); see also State v. 
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998). Evidence is sufficient if'"the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from 
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Stringham. 2001 UT App. 13, f 26, 17 P.3d 1153 (quoting 
State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App. 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949) (additional quotations omitted). 
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The charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted person requires that the State 
establish, among other things, that defendant "purchasefd], transfer[ed], possessefd], 
use[d], or ha[d] under his custody or control" a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3) 
(Supp. 2000). Add. A. Discharge of a firearm from a vehicle requires proof that 
defendant in fact discharged a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a). Add. A. The 
State adduced evidence below from two people that defendant held a gun in his left hand 
at the abandoned house and that he later fired that gun from a car. Both Maestas and 
Shell testified that they saw a small caliber handgun in defendant's left hand when they 
saw him near the abandoned house (R. 183:92,102, 121). Maestas further testified than 
in the ensuing chase, defendant put his left arm out the driver's side window of his Honda 
while holding the gun, heard the unmistakable sound of a single gunshot, then, while 
crouched on the bench seat of his truck, looked in the convex rearview mirror and saw 
defendant's hand recoil twice more (R. 183:96-99). 
Shell thereafter testified that after seeing defendant holding the gun, he continued 
down the block on his bike while defendant left the area in his car (R. 183:121-24). 
Shortly thereafter, Shell heard the unmistakable sound of at least two gunshots coming 
from the direction Maestas had testified the shooting occurred (R. 183:93-94, 123-26). 
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably determine that defendant not only 
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possessed, but used the firearm, rendering the evidence sufficient to support the 
convictions on both charges.6 
Defendant claims that this evidence is too "speculative," "improbable," and 
"unreliable," and points to the absence of any "compelling evidence" that he held or fired 
a gun. Br. of Aplt. at 28, 31-34. However, when the evidence presented at trial conflicts 
or is disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 240 
(Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). This 
Court will not substitute its own judgment on witness credibility for that of the jury, and 
will not weigh conflicting evidence. See State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 22 (Utah App. 
1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). Further, the mere existence of 
conflicting evidence or inferences does not warrant reversal. Id. 
Defense counsel made the same basic argument to the jury below regarding the 
absence of the "compelling evidence" defendant notes on appeal-no gun, no shell 
casings, no bullet holes, and no reports of shots being fired (R. 183:193-95). The jury 
was aware that Maestas and Shell had known each other a long time and that, while they 
had time to discuss the relevant events between their occurrence and the trial, they had 
6Shell provided other testimony corroborative of Maestas' testimony, including: 
the location of defendant at the abandoned house and the timing of his appearance, the 
gestures defendant made while at the abandoned house, the timing of squeeling tires that 
he heard shortly thereafter, and the description of defendant (R. 183:90-94, 97-100, 102, 
112, 114-15, 118-19, 121-22, 124-26, 129). 
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mentioned it to each other only on the day the events occurred and on the day of trial (R. 
183:128-29). The jury also knew about the fear Maestas felt at the time and was 
specifically instructed about the need to consider the various elements which could affect 
eyewitness testimony (R. 94-97, jury inst 16) (in Add. D).7 
The evidence on this element was a matter of witness credibility, which the jury 
decided against defendant after his counsel's express argument and after careful 
consideration of all the relevant factors pursuant to proper jury instructions. Defendant's 
argument on appeal presents no persuasive reason to believe that his trial counsel 
reasonably should have expected that a motion or objection relating to the sufficiency of 
this evidence would be successful. Neither has he established that the trial judge likely 
would have decided the credibility issue amy differently. Because the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, defendant has not established that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to make a futile motion or objection, and this claim fails. 
C. The Evidence was Sufficient to Support Defendant's Conviction for Witness 
Tampering 
As with the other two convictions, defendant complains that there was no 
"compelling evidence" that he owned a gun or fired one at the victim. Br. of Aplt. at 26-
31. Once again, so long as the jury credited the testimony of Maestas and Shell, there was 
sufficient evidence to support their determination that defendant had a gun in his 
'Pursuant to State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 494-95 & n.8 (Utah 1986). 
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possession and fired it at least once during the altercation at issue. See subsection IIIB, 
supra. 
Defendant also complains that there was no evidence that Maestas was a witness 
or an informant in an official proceeding or investigation under way at the time of the 
altercation, preventing a conviction for witness tampering under section 76-8-508(2)(c). 
Br. of Aplt. at 35-36. However, pursuant to the argument in Point I, supra, the statute 
does not require that the State establish the actual existence of an official proceeding or 
investigation at the time of the tampering in order to convict a defendant under subsection 
(2)(c). Accordingly, defendant's claim is without merit. 
Finally, defendant argues that even if the trial court properly held that the State 
need only establish defendant's subjective belief that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be instituted, the evidence was insufficient to 
establish such a belief on defendant's part. Br. of Aplt. at 36. However, as the trial court 
held, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom amply support the jury's 
determination that defendant in fact held such a belief (R. 183:231) (in Add. D). 
Defendant, a known gang member, admitted that he had been painting graffiti on 
the bridge and the abandoned house when Maestas came upon each scene (R. 183:141, 
146-48). That conduct amounts to a class B misdemeanor in this case (R. 183:153). Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-107 (1999). The parties stipulated that at the time, defendant was a 
"restricted" person, inasmuch as he had been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile in 1997 
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for an offense which would have been a felony if done by an adult (R. 183:161-62). The 
jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant knew that his conduct was 
unlawful. The first time he saw Maestas pass the bridge, pull an immediate U-turn and 
pass again, defendant responded by immediately getting into his own car, turning it 
around, and following Maestas (R. 183:84-87). Defendant's conduct was such that 
Maestas feared for his safety, lost defendant, and parked his car out of sight of the street 
for fifteen minutes then began to take a different path to work so as to avoid defendant 
(R. 183:87-89). 
The second time defendant noticed Maestas drive by, he registered his recognition 
of him by pointing at him with one hand in a gesture Maestas took to be a threat (R. 
183:93-94, 114, 121-22). At this point, defendant knows that the same person is now able 
to place him at two different locations where the graffiti was done. He is also aware that 
it has only been minutes since he last saw Maestas at the bridge. A reasonable inference 
from this situation is that defendant recognizes that Maestas had time to report the 
sighting by the bridge during the intervening minutes. Even if the jury did not draw this 
inference, it is reasonable for the jury to determine that, as of the time defendant saw 
Maestas for the second time, he is fully aware that Maestas can identify him just as easily 
as he identified Maestas and that there is a good chance that an eyewitness who may not 
have reported a single sighting may well report to authorities seeing the same illegal 
conduct committed by the same person twice in one morning. Defendant's conduct 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thereafter—chasing and actually shooting at Maestas and causing Maestas to fear for his 
personal safety—strongly suggests that defendant believed that Maestas was likely to 
report both incidences and knew that Maestas, as an eyewitness, was likely to play a key 
part against him in an upcoming investigation. 
The fact that defendant's escalating conduct toward Maestas would subject him to 
felony prosecution suggests that defendant seriously believed his suspicions that Maestas 
either had or would report his sightings of defendant to the authorities and that defendant 
was intent on preventing him from doing so. 
The arguments defendant sets forth on appeal were presented by his counsel to the 
jury in his closing remarks below and were rejected by the jury in rendering verdicts of 
guilty as charged. The jury clearly believed the evidence and witnesses defendant 
attempts to discredit on appeal, and that evidence established both that defendant 
possessed and fired a gun at Maestas and that he subjectively believed an investigation 
was pending or about to be instituted. Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support his witness tampering conviction. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO MERGE THE WITNESS TAMPERING AND 
DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM CHARGES BECAUSE THE 
CHARGES DO NOT REQUIRE IDENTICAL ELEMENTS, AND 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
SEPARATE CHARGE AND CONVICTION FOR EACH CRIME 
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to merge the 
charge of discharging a firearm with the charge of witness tampering (R. 183:169-72) (in 
Add. E). Br. of Aplt. at 37-42. He argues that the charge of discharging a firearm is 
necessarily proved by the same or less than all the facts necessary to establish the charge 
of witness tampering. Id. at 40-42. He also argues that, under the facts of this case, the 
jury could not find that he was guilty of witness tampering without necessarily finding the 
requisite elements for discharge of a firearm. Id. at 37,40-42. Both these arguments fail 
under the circumstances of this case. 
An offense is an included offense when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-l-401(3)(a) (1999) (emphasis added). Generally, a comparison of the 
statutory elements of the offenses at issue will suffice to determine whether a greater-
lesser relationship exists between the statutes. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. However, where 
the offenses have multiple variations, this Court will also look beyond the statutory 
elements and "'consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship 
exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial.1" Id, at 241 
(quoting State v. HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). 
Discharge of a firearm may be committed in a variety of ways: 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
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(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the 
actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances . . . , in which 
case it is a third degree felony 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, 
knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered; 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a 
firearm in the direction of any vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508. Add. A. The jury was instructed on these variations (R. 
87, jury ins. 9) (in Add. E). 
Witness tampering may also be committed in a variety of ways. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-508. Add. A. In this case, the jury was instructed that they could convict 
defendant if they found, beyond a reasonable doubt, in relevant part, that he had 
communicated to Maestas a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to 
do bodily injury while harboring the subjective belief "that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted" (R. 88-89, jury ins. 10-11) (in Add. E 
and C, respectively). 
A comparison of the statutes as they apply to this case establishes that the elements 
of witness tampering do not necessarily include the elements of discharge of a firearm. 
Witness tampering requires that defendant act while harboring a subjective belief that an 
official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted. Discharge of a 
firearm requires no such intent. This point was made clear to the jury through the written 
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instructions (R. 87-89, jury ins. 9-11) and the prosecutor's closing argument (R. 183:203-
07). Additionally, the jury was instructed that 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. 
Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The 
fact that you may find the accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses 
charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged. 
(R. 86, jury ins. 8). The record shows no objection by defendant below to this instruction, 
and he argues no manifest error in the instruction on appeal. 
Not only was the jury properly instructed as to the additional element required for 
witness tampering and the need to base the convictions on different evidence, but the 
evidence readily permits the jury to made the requisite findings to support both 
convictions. The jury could reasonably have determined that Maestas felt threatened by 
defendant long before the gun was discharged. He was sufficiently threatened by 
defendant's following him the first time that he parked out of sight for fifteen minutes, 
despite being late to work (R. 183:87-89). He was thereafter sufficiently intimidated by 
defendant, the presence of a gun, and defendant's gesturing at him at the abandoned 
house to look in his rear view mirror after passing the house to see whether he was being 
followed (R. 183:93-95). It was at that point that Maestas determined that defendant was 
"coming after him," prompting Maestas to make mental plans to stop at a senior center to 
call the police (R. 183:93-95). The evidence is clear that defendant's actions and conduct 
imparted to Maestas a reasonable fear of bodily injury, without the need to consider 
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defendant's later act of actually discharging the gun in Maestas' direction. The latter act 
independently supports the conviction for discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. 
Because the jury was properly instructed as to the need for the additional element 
for the witness tampering conviction and the need to base each conviction on separate 
evidence, and because the evidence provides ample opportunity to the jury to comply with 
its legal responsibilities, the two charges did not maintain a greater-lesser relationship, 
and defendant's claim fails. See State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611,619 (Utah App. 1998); see 
also State v. Casev. 2001 UT App. 205,123,424 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; State v. Lopez. 
2001 UT App. 123, f 13, 24 P.3d 993. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jb day of September, 2001. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
2000 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1999 EDITION 
Placs in Pockst of Corresponding Bound Volume. 
FALSIFICATION IN OFFICIAL MATTERS 
76-8-508* Tampering with witness — Retaliation against 
witness or informant — Bribery — Communicat-
ing a threat. 
( D A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to 
induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has 
been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by 
another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of 
his doing any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would 
believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act 
performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
History: C. 1963, 76-8-608, enacted by L. Amendment Note*. — The 2000 amend 
1973, ch. 198,1 76-8-608; 1988, ch. 176,1 1; ment. effective May 1, 2000, added "or" in 
9000, ch. 1, i 116. Subsection (1Kb). 
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and ownership of dangerous weapons by certain 
persons. 
For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 
76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 
62A 7-101; or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent 
felony as defined in Section 76 3-203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for 
an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and 
intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I controlled sub-
stance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony 
offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony 
offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the 
United States. 
!) A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, 
las under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, 
:s, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same 
[\e. 
,5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in 
other section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under 
is custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section 
ntrol. 
listory: C. 1953, 76-10-503, enacted by L. 
X>, ch. 303, ft 5. 
lepeals and Reenactnients . — Laws 
>0, ch 303, § 5 repeals former § 76-10-503, 
enacted by L 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-503, 
*" «•«'•»"«»»« **\<\ tnHiis the present 
section, effective May 1, 2000. 
Laws 2000, ch. 90 attempted to amend this 
section, but the repeal and reenactment by ch. 
303 was given precedence by the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel 
76-10-608. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a 
highway, or in direction of any person, building, 
or vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or 
firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state; 
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utili-
ties including facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or 
distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic 
sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous 
weapon from the owner or person in charge of the property within 600 
feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, 
including a barn, poultry yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the 
person being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in 
charge of the property at the time in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor 
unless the actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances 
not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which 
case it is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to 
an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or 
persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be 
endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent 
to damage a habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), 
discharges a firearm in the direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a 
firearm in the direction of any vehicle. 
(3) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful 
defense of self or others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20 1 5 
and 76-10-523 and as otherwise provided by law. 
History: € . 1963, 76-10-508, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-606; 1990, ch. 328, ft 3; 
1992, ch. 99, ft I; 1995, ch. 23, ft 2; 1999, ch. 
295, ft 1; 2000, ch. 214, ft 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective March 14, 2000, added the 
clause beginning "and the convicted person" to 
the end of the introductory paragraph in Sub-
section (2); deleted Subsection (3), which con-
tained provisions relating to notice, gave the 
decision on enhanced penalties to the sentenc-
ing judge rather than the jury, and allowed the 
court to suspend the imposition or execution of 
the sentence; and made a related designation 
change. 
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
I have denied that motion and I'll state the basis 
for it. 
Referring to Utah Code 76-3-508, which is the 
statute governing this particular charge. And when 
interpreting a statute, one must try to read it internally 
consistently and make it consistent, from one provision to 
another. 
Subsection (1) specifically states that a person 
is guilty of this offense if the investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted. Subsection (2) , which is the 
12 I provision the State has used to file this charge, does not 
13 include that specific language. But based on what I read to 
14 I be the intent of this statute, I must also read Section 2 to 
be consistent with Section 1. So I believe "about to be 
instituted" is consistent with what the statutory intent is. 
17 I Moreover, under Bradley and other cases, it is 
18 clear that it is a subjective evaluation that we enter into 
19 such when we consider such statutes. And the subjective 
20 I element being what the defendant reasonably believes to be 
the case. I believe there's sufficient evidence presented 
by the State to at least send that issue to the jury, based 
on the information concerning defendant's conduct in this 
24 case. 
25 And that is the basis for my denial of this 
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motion. 
Appreciate the good argument that both parties 
have made. It was a very interesting argument, indeed. 
make --
availabl 
back --
returns. 
I will ask that you stay nearby or, if you leave, 
be available by cell phone and make that information 
.e to - to Lori so that we can move this on, get 
get you back as soon as possible once the jury 
All right. Thank you again for the good work. 
We're in recess. 
present 
verdict? 
verdict 
(Whereupon, court was in recess pending 
the return of the jury.) 
(Whereupon, at the hour of 1:19 p.m., 
the jury returned to the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: The record shall reflect the jury is 
and the defendant and both counsel are also present. 
First, have you chosen a presiding officer? 
MR. BELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: And is that you, Mr. Bell? 
MR. BELL: Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
THE COURT: And has the jury reached a unanimous 
> 
MR. BELL: It has. 
THE COURT: All right. I111 ask you to give that 
to my bailiff. And before I look at it, I want to 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I> 
You are hereby instructed that the offense of Tampering with a Witness, as 
charged in Count II of the Information, does not require ihe Slat. to prm o that an 
"official proceeding or investigation" was underway, but only that defendant believed 
that an "official proceeding 01* investigation" was underwayl 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
I'liiie , questions in thi s case is the 
identification ;r * -he defendant as the person who committed the 
crime. 
Many f JI foib .Jtfect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is i/hi- person *hu » uinmit'teJ t.he crime, you 
'ahouJd 'jonsider the following: 
I, Did the witness have adequate opportunity to observe the 
criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a. The length of time the witnesses obser' 'fid the actor; 
b. ietween the witness and the actor; 
Jhe extent which the actor " s features were 
visible and undisguised; 
d. ack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
e. The presence or (absence o! distracting noises or 
<iei i v 11 v" <iur inci trie 3bservation; 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Ifp 
Page Two 
f. Any other circumstances affecting the witness1 
opportunity to observe the person committing the crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person 
committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the 
witness' capacity was impaired by: 
a. Stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b. Personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c. Uncorrected visual defects; 
d. Fatigue or injury; 
e. Drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of a different 
race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person of a 
different race may be less reliable than identification by a person 
of the same race, 
3. Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal 
actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the 
witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time he 
observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate opportunity 
i '' \ \ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. lL 
Page Three 
and capacit - - • have done so 
unless h* ^ - crime was being committed. 
4 witness1 identification of the defendant 
complete' - r 
In answering this questions, you should consider: 
.1 The length of time that passed betweei \ the " witness 
; , . s identification of the defendant; 
b I he witness' capacity arid state of mind at the time 
of the identification; 
The. witness1 exposure to opinions, descriptions or 
identification given by other witnesses, to photographs or 
newspaper account > - influence that 
may have affected the independence of his identification; 
d Any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness t-o 
the crjme, f.aijlei1! I r identify U'M» iJetend.int; 
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Page Four 
e. Any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent 
with the defendant's appearance; 
f. The circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. You may also take 
into account that identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable than identifications made from a 
photograph. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime is on the 
prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the 
eyewitness testimony in light of the consideration listed above, 
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must find him. not guilty. 
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1 may, we're where we're at. 
2 I just think that there was not enough evidence 
3 given on that element that a jury could reasonably infer 
4 that he believed that Mr. Maestas had called and was now a 
5 witness in the technical sense of a witness. 
6 And I'll submit it to the Court on that. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 I fm persuaded by the State's argument. I think 
9 that it doesn't make sense to read a statute excluding the 
10 type of conduct that Mr. Yanez embarked upon, having chased 
n the victim and lost him and seeing him again within about a 
12 15-, 20-minute period and then following him and shooting 
13 him. I defer to the jury on their decision, and certainly 
14 believe that there was sufficient evidence for them to have 
15 reached that conclusion. 
16 Therefore, the motion is denied. 
17 Let's speak about sentencing then. You've 
18 reviewed that presentence report now, Mr. Cramer? 
19 MR. CRAMER: We have, Your Honor, and we find 
20 nothing in it that's -- that we would want to add to or 
2i correct. I think it's fairly accurate and fairly thorough. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, for the State. 
23 MR. NIELSEN: Thanks, Your Honor. 
24 The State's going to ask the Court to follow the 
25 recommendations of the presentence report and commit the 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ 
Before you can find the defendant, Jaime Yanez, guilty of the offense of 
Discharge of Firearm From a Vehicle, Near Highway, or in Direction of any Person, 
Building, or Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements: 
1. That on or about May 9, 2000; 
2. In Salt Lake County; 
3. The defendant; 
4. Did discharge a firearm; 
5. In the direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to 
believe that any person may be endangered, 
or 
in the direction of any vehicle with the intent to intimidate or harass 
another. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and everyone of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Discharge of Firearm From a Vehicle, Near Highway, 
or in Direction of .my Person, Building, oi Vehicle, as charged in Count I of the 
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable dotibl \ A 
any one or mor^  >regoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
Before you can find the defendant, Jaime Yanez, guilty of the offense of 
Tampering with a Witness, as charged in Count II of the Information, you must find from 
all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements: 
1. That on or about May 9, 2000; 
2. In Salt Lake County; 
3. The defendant; 
4. Did communicate to Robert Maestas a threat that a reasonable person 
would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury; 
5. Because of any act performed or to be performed by Robert Maestas in his 
capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or 
investigation. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and everyone of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Tampering with a Witness, as charged in Count II of the 
Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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21 
23 
24 
1 pronounces his name as it's spelled, which is Jaime, I don't 
2 want to be calling him by the wrong name. 
3 THE DEFENDANT: It's Jaime. 
4 THE COURT: Jaime? Okay. Apologize for that and 
5 J I'll clarify that. All right. Thank you. 
6 I Record should reflect that defense counsel had 
7 come to the bench in a timely manner with a motion at the 
8 end of the State's testimony in this case. Mr. Cramer, give 
9 you a chance to argue. 
10 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, just briefly. We would 
n just propose that - - w e would motion -- I would have 
12 motioned at the proper time and did motion at the proper 
13 J time 
14 i THE COURT: You did so and the record reflects 
15 I that it was timely. 
16 I MR. CRAMER: Okay. That we would request the 
17 Court dismiss Count 2 on the grounds that the State hasn't 
18 proven that Mr. Maestas was in the capacity of a witness or 
19 I an informant in an official proceeding or investigation at 
the time of the incident. He testified that he was not an 
informant for any law enforcement agencies, he had not 
22 contacted any law enforcement agency at the time that this 
incident happened and so was, therefore, not a witness in an 
official proceeding and, therefore, we'd request that the 
25 Court dismiss Count 2. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 Mr. Nielsen? 
3 MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, I think the State has 
4 offered some evidence, or at least sufficient evidence, to 
5 allow this matter to go to the jury short of a directed 
6 verdict on it. The caselaw is clear that, in the definition 
7 of an investigation, it doesn't have to be one that's going 
8 on at that time or thereafter but that there's the 
9 likelihood that one will be instituted. And we can provide 
10 the cases to Your Honor if you'd like. But, obviously, in 
n this case, if Mr. Maestas, who said that he's observed 
12 graffiti, contacted the police, certainly observed the 
13 defendant walking around with a gun, makes him a witness to 
14 some potential criminal act. And the likelihood, according 
15 to the detective, was that they were following up on a 
15 graffiti complaint. An investigation would have pursued 
17 from there. 
18 I don't think the requirement is we have to show 
19 there was in fact an active investigation pending at the 
20 time or that it was imminent, but believe that there was the 
21 possibility of an investigation and that Mr. Robert Maestas 
22 would have been a witness in that investigation. 
23 MR. CRAMER: Your Honor, one -- and I was already 
24 going to argue this first, and if the Court wishes to grant 
25 Counsel a rebuttal, I would not object. 
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THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CRAMER: I would argue that, also, the grounds 
that this witness tampering is merged with the other two 
charges similar to the recent case -- and I don't have the 
case cite with me and I didn't bring it with me -- where the 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court held that the 
kidnapping and rape are not necessarily -- cannot be charged 
in every rape, because every rape has an element of forced--
type of a forced -- what's the word I'm looking for --
restriction and restraining --
THE COURT: Right. Right. 
MR. CRAMER: -- of the victim. And, therefore, I 
would argue that -- likewise, that every violent act that 
may be charged against somebody would then also contain some 
element of a witness tampering-type charge and that it's 
merged because --
THE COURT: Well, that merger would go to the 
discharge of the firearm charge. But what Mr. Nielsen has 
argued is that the investigation would be with regard to the 
graffiti, the tagging, and it was with that. I think your 
argument's well taken and it was a Utah State Supreme Court 
as a Justice Stewart decision quite recently. But that's 
not what Mr. Nielsen was arguing. 
Isn't that what you're saying, that it would merge 
with the discharge of a firearm? 
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1 MR. CRAMER: Yes. That the -- that the witness 
2 tampering would merge with the discharge of a firearm 
3 charge. 
4 THE COURT: Right. 
5 MR. CRAMER: And, as I said, I didn't argue that 
6 in my first --
7 THE COURT: Right. That's fine. 
8 MR. CRAMER: -- representation. So if the Court 
9 wanted to hear from Mr. Nielsen, I would certainly --
10 THE COURT: I'd like to hear from Mr. Nielsen on 
n that. 
12 MR. NIELSEN: We don't believe there's any merger 
13 because there's no greater or lesser relationship where 
14 these would merge. And we are arguing that witness 
15 tampering is the witness in observing the graffiti or the 
16 defendant with the gun and not the actual offense of 
17 discharging the weapon or being a restricted person or 
18 anything of that nature. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to deny the motion 
20 with regard to the merger argument based on what I've 
21 already stated. But I am going to take the issue under 
22 advisement with regard to the -- the previous argument, 
23 which was official proceeding or investigation, Mr. Nielsen. 
24 I'm simply not familiar with that caselaw. And if you could 
25 get that to me, and Mr. Cramer, if you could do that. 
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